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Theo A. F. Kuipers 
MODERATE REALISM AND METAPHORS 
REPLY TO HANS MOOIJ 
When I was preparing my dissertation in the years 1973-7, Hans Mooij and 
Aart Stam were the ideal supervisors. The more problematic stories about 
supervisors I heard, the more I understood how exceptionally good my 
situation as a “promovendus” (Ph.D. student) was. Reading Mooij’s paper 
reminded me again of this fact, but now in a somewhat embarrassing way. Had 
I shown him my draft of ICR, he would have redrawn my attention to 
Toulmin’s discussion of the map metaphor in his seminal book. Now my only 
face-saving option is to confess that my ideal world includes Hans Mooij as 
permanent supervisor. 
Moderate Realism 
Let me start, however, with what I see as Mooij’s main critical point. 
According to him, I do not make sufficiently clear the extent to which my 
constructive realism goes beyond minimal metaphysical realism, without 
becoming essentialist realism by assuming an ideal conceptualization of the 
world. He writes in Section 1:
If science can deliver objective knowledge about the observable and non-observable 
aspects of the world, then there must be, not only the world, but a way the world is; it 
cannot be completely indefinite or malleable. Perhaps there need not be one and only one 
way the world is, independent of any conceptualization. However, certain 
conceptualizations must be accurate and correct. 
I certainly agree that I assume some in-between, moderate, metaphysical 
realism, but I cannot agree with his suggestion that this should be based on a 
notion of  ‘correct conceptualizations’ that is weaker than the notion of (being 
part of) the ideal conceptualization. Certainly, if he means by a correct 
conceptualization merely that all its terms are referring to something in – or 
some aspect of – the world, then I could agree. But I am afraid Mooij means 
more than this minimal condition for a satisfactory vocabulary, for the 
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reference condition does not exclude terms like ‘grue’ and one merely 
referring to an “undetached rabbit part,” to vary Quine’s famous example. 
Instead of postulating that there are correct vocabularies in a stronger sense, 
my moderate metaphysics regarding the claim that “there must be … a way the 
world is” is very explicitly of a hybrid metaphysical-epistemological nature as, 
for example, expressed in the concluding passage of Section 13.5 (“The 
metaphysical nature of scientific research”, ICR, p. 327):  
In sum, the scientist studies objective features of THE NOMIC WORLD by choosing a 
domain and a vocabulary. Although many choices, partly of a conceptual constructive 
nature, have to be made, nothing like radical social constructivism is the result, for THE 
NOMIC WORLD determines what we will find, given our choices. That is, although 
constructive realism recognizes several relativistic features, it does not at all lead to 
radical relativism: given previous choices, we cannot find what we want. Of course, we 
can frequently find what we want, but only by adapting our choices of domain and 
vocabularies in an appropriate way, that is, in agreement with the nature of THE NOMIC 
WORLD.16
Hence, in my view the “way the world is” is not something that can be 
expressed in terms of (in-)correct vocabularies but is of a dispositional nature, 
and hence, metaphorically, of a stimulus-response nature: imposing this
vocabulary on that domain yields those true and false statements. I also think 
that this is very much the kind of moderate metaphysical realism that is 
subscribed to by Niiniluoto, Searle and, for that matter, Toulmin (1953, p. 128; 
1960, p. 115). Hence, being in their company, as Mooij claims I am, is what I 
agree about, but I do not think that Boyd and Harré belong to the same group, 
simply because, as Mooij points out, they at least subscribe to some kind of 
correct, if not ideal, language.
I can further illustrate my view with one particular point in his 
argumentation. He writes: “If there are correct or ideal conceptualizations, then 
there may come an end to the improvement of vocabularies; just as (in 
Kuipers’ view) there may come an end to the improvement of theories, viz. by 
finding the strongest true exemplar.” (p. 497) This comparison of vocabularies 
and theories in terms of improvement seems inadequate to me. Given a domain 
and a vocabulary the improvement of theories about that domain in that 
vocabulary has its limits, set by the thus implied (unknown, but operative) 
truth. However, given only a domain, there is no boundary for correct 
vocabularies, at least not for referring ones, for, as already indicated, they can 
be crated at will. On the other hand, if correct vocabularies in a stronger sense 
were to exist and their improvement were to come to an end, they would be 
                                                          
16 Incidentally, the closing phrase “in agreement with the nature of THE NOMIC WORLD” is an 
essentialist slip of my pen. It would have been better to write: “in agreement with  and using the 
provisional findings about  THE NOMIC WORLD”. 
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combinable in some way or other and lead to the ideal vocabulary for that 
domain. Certainly this would be a serious option if the world were designed, 
but we may assume that it isn’t. 
Metaphors
Turning to the general topic of metaphors, I like Boyd’s distinction, referred to 
by Mooij, between constitutive (C-) and exegetic (E-)metaphors. In principle, 
both can occur in science or be about science. Although I certainly have 
interest in both kinds of metaphors and analogies in science (SiS, p. 11) and 
whereas I do not remember having read or heard about stimulating                   
C-metaphors about science, my specific interest in metaphors in the last 
chapter of ICR certainly concerns only E-metaphors about science, viz. 
exegeses of my meta-view of science as developed in ICR. As indicated above, 
Hans Mooij points out, in his characteristically polite way, that I was 
essentially re-inventing the wheel by my arguments in favor of the map 
metaphor relative to the mirror and the net metaphor. In particular, rereading 
Toulmin’s excellent plea for the map metaphor and against the net metaphor 
convinced me that he had already said the most essential things in this respect. 
And indeed, as suggested by Mooij, in the relevant chapter (“Theories and 
Maps”) Toulmin is much less the anti-realist than he is usually supposed to be, 
probably on the basis of the preceding chapter (“Laws of Nature”). Even the 
latter division can be questioned: rereading Toulmin’s claims about 
determining the “scope” of both laws and theories, it is tempting to reinterpret 
his analysis in terms of what I mean by dialectically establishing a domain in 
combination with a vocabulary (exceeding the “domain vocabulary”) and the 
true theory (ICR, p.  332): 
More precisely, in the short-term dynamics of ‘science in the making’ three things are 
established in dialectical interaction: the domain as a (unproblematically conceptualized) 
part or aspect of THE NOMIC WORLD, the (extra) vocabulary and the true theory about 
that domain as seen through that vocabulary. 
Hence, Toulmin’s claims seem very much compatible with the constructive 
realist attitude developed in ICR. However, unfortunately, the precise nature of 
this dialectical interaction has not yet been elaborated. Only some anticipations 
were set out regarding domain variation (ICR, p. 207). A detailed elaboration 
of “truth approximation by domain variation” is not merely a technical 
challenge, it will certainly improve our philosophical-methodological insights. 
For a start, see my reply to Zwart. 
Of course, I was very happy with Mooij’s support of the map metaphor, by 
references and arguments. It inspired me to combine the map metaphor with 
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the language of possibilities, leading to the following quasi-metaphorical 
characterizations of four kinds of research (cf. SiS, Ch. 1). 
– Theoretical research:
    mapping nomic (physical, chemical, biological,…) (im-)possibilities  
– Experimental research:
   realizing and mapping (by definition, nomic) possibilities 
– Technical/design research:   
    mapping and realizing intended possibilities 
– Historical research:
   mapping (naturally or artificially) realized possibilities 
I speak of quasi-metaphorical characterizations because it is hard to conceive 
of the language of possibilities, let alone that of their realization, as 
metaphorical. The combination with mapping, however, in particular when 
applied to theoretical or nomological research, seems to satisfy all the criteria I 
suggested in ICR (pp. 330-2) for an adequate metaphor for that kind of 
research.17 According to that exposition, we should distinguish sharply 
between the vocabularies and theories formulated with them to characterize a 
given domain (beyond its characterization in terms of the “domain 
vocabulary”). In the terms of the map metaphor, a vocabulary corresponds to a 
mapping method, determining which aspects of the domain will be mapped in 
what manner. A specific theory corresponds to the result of a particular 
attempt to map the domain, the resulting map. In this way the map metaphor 
satisfies in general three of the four joint criteria for a metaphor for 
vocabularies and theories: both have to be and are constructive, selective and 
referentially improvable. Moreover, theories as resulting maps satisfy the 
theory-specific criterion that theories should be substantially improvable, for 
many mistakes can be made in the application of a mapping method leading to 
a mapping product (cf. Toulmin, 1953, p. 127; 1960, p. 114). 
The three joint features and the theory-specific one remain when one 
speaks more specifically of mapping possibilities, introducing the non-
metaphorical notion of  possibilities. However, a metaphor for theories should 
also include the nomic target of theories, viz. nomic possibilities. By speaking 
of “mapping nomic (im-)possibilities” I include this aspect by definition, 
leading to a second non-metaphorical aspect of the metaphor. Last but not 
least, an adequate metaphor should highlight the already indicated dialectical 
interaction in establishing three things: “the domain as a (unproblematically 
conceptualized) part or aspect of THE NOMIC WORLD, the (extra) 
                                                          
17 I thank Hans Mooij for revealing the mistake regarding the net-metaphor in Table 13.2 (ICR, 
p. 333), reported in his Note 16. Moreover, I certainly agree with Mooij’s closing statement that 
this metaphor suggests the wrong kind of metaphysics, viz. minimal realism. 
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vocabulary and the true theory about that domain as seen through that 
vocabulary.” (ICR, p. 332). This dialectical feature seems also to be covered, 
like the nomic feature, not so much by the metaphorical mapping but by its 
specific target of nomic possibilities. Since a vocabulary determines the 
“conceptual possibilities,” and the combination of a vocabulary and a given 
domain determines the “nomic possibilities,” and hence “the true theory,” 
there are two independent variables and a dependent one, which leaves room 
for a dialectical determination of an attractive triple. 
In sum, instead of finding a satisfactory pure metaphor, asked for in the 
closing sentences of ICR, we have obtained a highly satisfactory partial 
metaphor. Guided by this partial metaphor, I would like to confirm that I see 
truth approximation not as “just an epistemic notion. It is also a moral 
injunction” (p. 499), not only for scientists, but also for judges and other 
professionals for whom the (relevantly restricted and conceptualized) truth 
makes all the difference. However, this certainly is not a moral injunction for 
all professionals  it does not hold for artists, for example. 
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